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Abstract
This Note argues that article 27 [of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations] provides
for the absolute inviolability of the diplomatic bag. Part I discusses the history of the Vienna Convention and its provisions concerning the diplomatic bag. Part II sets forth instances of abuse of
the diplomatic bag, proposed remedies, and the arguments in favor of such remedies. Part III suggests that the proper construction of article 27 of the Vienna Convention is that the diplomatic bag
is absolutely inviolable and, thus, immune from nonintrusive examinations. This Note concludes
that the status of the bag should be reconsidered in order to enable governments to curb its abuses.

"OPENING" PANDORA'S BOX: THE STATUS OF THE
DIPLOMATIC BAG IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
INTRODUCTION
For centuries, governments and their envoys stationed
abroad have used diplomatic bags.1 The diplomatic bag, which
is usually a canvas sack, is intended for the confidential conveyance of documents between a government and its missions
abroad. 2 Eventually, diplomats used the bag to convey articles
as well as documents; thus, the bag became the smuggling diplomat's perfect means by which to transport contraband as valuable as jewels and as lethal as machine guns across international borders.3 At first glance, subjecting the bag to metal detectors, electronic scanning, or canine sniffing without opening
or detaining the bag 4 would appear to be a simple solution to
the worldwide problem of abuses of the diplomatic bag. Proposals to implement these nonintrusive examinations, however, have given rise to a dispute5 as to whether such examina1. Thorny Issue: Peeking into a Privileged Pouch, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1988, at B6,
col. 3 [hereinafter Thorny Issue].
2. C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCO'rr, DIPLOMATIC CRIME 190 (1987). A diplomatic mis-

sion is defined as the
diplomatic presence of one state (the sending state) in the territory of another (the receiving state) for which special treatment is accorded by the
latter state. The diplomatic mission is the official representation of the
sending state to the receiving state and is permanently housed in the capital
of that state, for which it receives the protection of that state and full diplomatic privileges and immunities.
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW DICTIONARY 95 (1987).
3. See C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTr, supra note 2, at 193; Thorny Issue, supra note 1.

4. Some regard electronic scanning as "constructive opening." See Higgins, The
Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Recent United Kingdom Experience, 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 641, 647 (1985).
5. See, e.g., C. ASHMAN & P. TREscOrr, supra note 2, at 215-19 (setting forth

United Kingdom's position as to electronic scanning of diplomatic bags); E. DENZA,
DIPLOMATIC LAW 4 (1976) (scientific methods of detection without opening diplo-

matic bag are not prohibited by the Vienna Convention); C. LEwis, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 191-92 (1985) (expressing position of United Kingdom that Vienna
Convention does not preclude nonintrusive examinations); Cameron, First Report of
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 610, 615-18
(1985) (inviolability of diplomatic bag not contingent on its contents); Goldberg, The
Shoot-Out at the Libyan Self-Sty'led People s Bureau. .4 Case of State-Supported International
Terrorism, 30 S.D.L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (diplomatic bag is not absolutely inviolable);
Note, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1517, 1534-35
(1986) (Vienna Convention does not preclude nonintrusive examinations); U.S.
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tions are permitted under article 27 of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations (the "Vienna Convention" or the
"Convention"), 6 which provides 7that "[t]he diplomatic bag
shall not be opened or detained."
This Note argues that article 27 provides for the absolute
inviolability of the diplomatic bag. Part I discusses the history
of the Vienna Convention and its provisions concerning the
diplomatic bag. Part II sets forth instances of abuse of the diplomatic bag, proposed remedies, and the arguments in favor of
such remedies. Part III suggests that the proper construction
of article 27 of the Vienna Convention is that the diplomatic
bag is absolutely inviolable and, thus, immune from nonintrusive examinations. This Note concludes that the status of the
bag should be reconsidered in order to enable governments to
curb its abuses.
DEP'T OF STATE, STUDY AND

REPORT CONCERNING THE STATUS OF INDIVIDUALS WITH

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1988) (bag is absolutely inviolable

under current regime).
6. Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
7. Id. art. 27(3), 23 U.S.T. at 3239, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 13, 500
U.N.T.S. at
110.
Section 466 of the Restatement of the Law Third, Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, provides that "[t]he . . . communications of an accredited
diplomatic mission or consular post are inviolable, and are immune from any exercise ofjurisdiction by the receiving state that would interfere with their official use."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 466
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD]. The position of the Restatement Third is that
a diplomatic bag may be opened in the presence of the sending state's authorities or
may be returned to the sending state if the receiving state has "serious reason to
believe" that the bag contains something other than correspondence, documents, or
articles intended for official' use. Id. comment f. The Vienna Convention does not
provide for such action. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 27, 23 U.S.T. at
3239, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 13, 500 U.N.T.S. at 108, 110; see also infra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text.
The Restatement Third's position on this issue is derived from draft articles on the
Status of the Diplomatic Courier and the Diplomatic Bag Not Accompanied by Diplomatic Courier, which the International Law Commission provisionally adopted in
1986. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra, reporters' note 6. The draft articles providing for
the status of the diplomatic bag generally track the language of article 35(3) of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. See infra note 58. However, it has yet to
be decided whether the rule it espouses will apply to the diplomatic bag. See Report of
the InternationalLaw Commission on the [['ork of its Thirty-Eighth Session, 41 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 10) at 72, U.N. Doc. A/41/10 (1986) [hereinafter Report of the Commission
Thirt'-Eighth Session]. For further discussion of the draft articles that the International
Law Commission provisionally adopted in 1986, see infra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
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I. THE VIENNA CONVENTION AND THE S TA TUS OF THE
DIPLOMA TIC BAG
A. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
1. History
In 1953, the United Nations requested the International
Law Commission (the "Commission") 8 to reexamine the subject of diplomatic intercourse and immunities with the intent
to codify this area of international law.9 The General Assembly considered codification of the customary international
law' O on this subject to be a necessary factor in the improvement of relations between states.I Experience had shown that
tranquil and efficient relations between states depended
largely on the existence of established rules of diplomatic rela12
tions.
8. The International Law Commission (the "Commission") was established by
the General Assembly of the United Nations to implement article 13 of the United
Nations Charter, which provides that one of the principle functions of the General
Assembly was to encourage "the progressive development of international law and
its codification." U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. 1(a). In its first session, the Commission compiled a provisional list of topics of international law selected for codification,
including the topic of "Diplomatic intercourse and immunities." See Report of the International Law Commission Covering its First Session, 4 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 3,

U.N. Doc. A/925 (1949).
9. See G.A. Res. 685, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 62, U.N. Doc. A/2361
(1952) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 685]; see also Do Nascimento E Silva, Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations (1961), in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 393, 394 (1986).
Earlier attempts at international codification are embodied in the New York Regulation of the Institut de Droit International, ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL: SESSION DE NEW-YORK 307 (1929) (amending the Cambridge Regulation of 1895); in the Sixth International American Conference, Feb. 20, 1928, 155
L.N.T.S. 259; and in the Harvard Research Draft Convention of 1932, Research in
International Law 19 (1932). Research in International Law See generally Denza, Diplomatic Agents and Missions, Privileges andInimunities, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L.
94, 95 (1986); Research in InternationalLaw, 26 AM.J. INT'L L. 1, 19-187 (Supp. 1932).
The Harvard Research Draft Convention of 1932 greatly influenced the International
Law Commission s work on codifying diplomatic law. See Denza, supra, at 95. In addition, the Vienna Convention is considered to be a sequel to the seventeenth annex
to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, Mar. 19, 1815, 2 Martens Nouveau
Recueil (ser. 2), 449, which contained the, regulation on, the Classification of diplomatic agents. See United Nations Coiference on Diplomatic Intercourseand Ininuiities: Summary Records of PlenaryIeetingsand of .1leetingi of the Committee of the Wl'hole, at 2 U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.20/14 (1961) [hereinafter 'nited A'ations Conference].

10. For a discussion of the general development of customary international law,
see infra note 52 and accompanying text.
11. G.A. Res. 685, supra note 9, .a62.
12. See Uhited Nations Conference, supra note 9, at 1. In opening the Conference,
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In its ninth session, the Commission began its debate on a
draft document'" relating to diplomatic intercourse and immunities.' 4 At the end of the ninth session, an amended draft was
distributed among the member states of the United Nations for
comments and observations. 15 During the Commission's tenth
session, a new draft was completed and forwarded to the General Assembly of the United Nations.' 6 The General Assembly
convened an international conference to consider the question
of diplomatic intercourse and immunities1 7 and requested that
the conference use the results of the work of the Commission's
tenth session as the basis for its consideration.' 8 The United
Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities (the "Vienna Conference" or the "Conference") met in Vienna in 1961 and, relying on the work of the Commission, created and adopted the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. '
2. Theoretical Justifications for Diplomatic Immunity
Since diplomatic immunity was first discussed in legal
tle acting president stated that the topic of diplomatic intercourse and immunities
" its very nature permeated relations between States, for it was vitally important
that they should be conducted with the minimum of friction and the maximum of
goodwill and facility." Id.
13. See Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities. Report Submitted by A.E.F. Sandstrmn,
Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/91 (1955).
14. See Summaryn Records of the 383rd Weeting, [1957] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 2,

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1957.
15. See Do Nascimento E Silva, supra note 9, at 394.
16. See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission Covering the Jlork of its Tenth Session, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/3859 (-1958) [hereinafter Report of the
Commission's Tenth Session]; see also Do Nascimento E Silva, supra note 9, at 394.

17. See G.A. Res. 1450, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 56,
A/4354 (1959).
18. Id. at

1, U.N. Doc.

7.

19. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, 23 U.S.T. at 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500
U.N.T.S. at 95; see E. DENZA, snpra note 5, at 2. The Vienna Convention was not open
to all states, but only to member states of the United Nations, to any of the United
Nations specialized agencies or parties to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, and to any other. states invited by the United Nations General Assembly to
become a party to the Convention. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 48, 23
U.S.T. at 3249, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 23, 500 U.N.T.S. at 124; see also Do Nascimento
E Silva, supra note 9, at 394. Eighty-one states participated in the Conference. See
United Aations Conference, supra note 9, at x-xviii; see also E. DENZA, supra note 5, at 2. As
ofjanuary 1988, 153 states have ratified the Convention. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES
DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, STATUS AS AT 31 DEC. 1987, at 52-53 U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/6 (1988).
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literature, scholars have set forth various overlapping theories
to justify immunity.2 0 The theories, however, can be separated
into the categories of"exterritoriality,"' "representative char23
acter, "22 and "functional necessity."
The theory of exterritoriality gained ascendency during
the sixteenth century, when resident ambassadors replaced ad
hoc diplomats as the favored means of conducting relations
between states. 24 Under the theory of exterritoriality, the diplomat and his "suite ' 25 resided entirely beyond the territory of
the receiving state.2 6 Therefore, neither the diplomat nor his
suite could be subjected to the criminal and civil jurisdiction of
the receiving state. 27 Legal scholars began criticizing the the20. See, e.g., E. ADAIR, THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF AMBASSADORS IN TIHE SIX(1929) (setting forth theoretical justifications
for various diplomatic immunities); H. GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 210-16
(W. Whewell trans. 1853) (discussing need and theoretical justifications for diplo-

TEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

matic immunity); M. OGDON, JURIDICAL BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 3 (1936)

(general discussion of theoretical bases of diplomatic immunity); Hurst, Diplomatic
Immunities-Modern Developments, 10 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1929) (discussing development of theories that justify diplomatic immunity).
21. "Exterritoriality" should not be confused with "extraterritoriality," which is
the application of laws to acts occurring outside the geographical boundaries of the
enacting state's jurisdiction. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (5th ed. 1979). Until
recently, scholars often used these terms interchangeably and confused the distinction between the two concepts. See also M. OGDON, supra note 20, at 4; see, e.g., E.
ADAIR, supra note 20 (using vord "extraterritoriality" in discussing theory of exterritoriality).
22. "Representative character," was often confused with the theory of exterritoriality. See M. OGDON, supra note 20, at 78, 106-07. It has, however, been recognized
as a separate and independent theory. See id. at 109; H. REIFF, DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES, AND PRACTICE 25 (1954).

23. See H. REIFF, supra note 22, at 24-27 (discussing the three theories used to
justify diplomatic immunities); see also Garretson, The Immunities of Representatives of
Foreign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 70 (1966) (discussing theories in context of Vienna Convention); Note, InsuringAgainst Abuse of Diplomatic Immllunity, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1517, 1520-21 (1986) (generally discussing three theories used to justify diplomatic
immunities).
24. See E. ADAIR, snupra note 20, at 9; Young, The Development of the Law of Diplomatic Relations, 40 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 141, 152 (1964).
25. The "suite" included the diplomat's family, servants, administrative personnel, diplomat's residence, personal property, and the embassy premises. No distinction between these categories had been made when exterritoriality was the dominant
theory by which to justify diplomatic privileges and immunities. See E. ADAIR, Snpra
note 20, at 115-17.
26. See M. OGDON, supra note 20, at 78; H. REIFF, supra note 22, at 24; see also
Hurst, supra note 20, at 4.
27. See M. OGDON, s11pra note 20, at 78. Grotius succinctly expressed exterritoriality as follows:
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ory of exterritoriality at the end of the nineteenth century, asserting that a literal application of exterritoriality created situa"
tions undesirable to the receiving state and led to absurd results if carried to the extreme. 2 8 Therefore, present-day efforts
to justify privileges and immunities have not relied on the the29
ory of exterritoriality.
The representative-character theory bases diplomatic immunity on the characterization of diplomatic personnel as the
monarch's "alter ego" '3 0 or, more accurately, identifies the
sending state with the organs through which it functions internationally. 3 ' The consent of a state to receive a diplomat implies consent that the diplomat will receive the privileges that
are essential to the dignity of his sovereign.3 2 The representative-character theory, however, has been criticized as unsatis[Tihe common rule, that he who is in a foreign territory is subject to that
territory, does, by the common consent of nations, suffer an exception in the
case of ambassadors; they being, by a certain fiction, in the place of those
who send them ... and thus, are not bound by the Civil Law of the People
among whom they live.
GROTIUS, supra note 20, at 213.
28. See, e.g., M. OGDON, supra note 20, at 84 (setting forth opinions of Dr. Ernst
Beling and Franz von Liszt that exterritoriality does not exempt ambassadors from all
obligations of local law); Lyons, Immunities Other thanJurisdictionalof the Property of Diplomatic Envoys, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 116, 150 (1953) (diplomatic immunity should
not be based on principle that embassy or mission is "foreign soil," but on principle
of diplomatic functions). By the mid-eighteenth century, the problems with a literal
application of the exterritoriality theory became apparent when local common
criminals would flee to diplomatic missions or claim attachment to a diplomatic suite,
thereby eluding prosecution. See Young, supra note 24, at 156.
29. See H. REIFF, supra note 22, at 25; Preuss, Capacityfor Legation and the Theoretical Basis of Diplomatic Immunities, 10 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 170, 178 (1932).
30. Bergman v. DeSieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aft'd, 170 F.2d
360 (2d Cir. 1948). Montesquieu assimilated the ambassador's independence to that
of his sovereign by linking the person of the ambassador with the eighteenth-century
concept of an absolutely independent and sovereign state. See M. 'OcooN,supra note
20, at 107.
31. See H. REIFF, supra note 22, at 25; Preuss, supra note 29, at 178.
32. See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 74, 87, 7 Cranch 116, 138
(1812). In writing the opinion in this case, ChiefJustice Marshall stated that
[tihe assent of the sovereign to the very important and extensive exemptions from territorial jurisdiction which are admitted to attach to foreign
ministers, is implied from the considerations, that, without such exemption,
every sovereign would hazard his own dignity, by employing a public minister abroad ....
[A] consent to receive [a public minister] implies a consent
that he shall possess . . . privileges which are essential to the dignity of his
sovereign, and to the duties he is bound to perform.
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factory in several respects. First, the principles that the "King
can do no wrong" or that "the Sovereign is above the law since
he creates the law" have been criticized as too broad and too
fictitious for conducting international relations.
Second, the
representative-character theory is too narrow, in that it does
not offer a basis for granting immunity for unofficial acts. 4
Third, the representative-character theory has been criticized
as incompatible with the modern conception of the nationstate where sovereignty is derived from the people governed,
not from the person of a monarch
The third theory that has developed to justify diplomatic
immunity is the functional-necessity theory. The term "functional necessity" was first mentioned in scholarly writings in
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, when
the functions of the diplomat were increasing in importance. 6
The theory recognizes immunities only to the degree necessary
37
to permit the efficient functioning of the diplomatic process.
Accordingly, functional necessity does not require immunity
for acts that are not essential to the diplomatic process. 38 The
33. See H. REIFF, supra note 22, at 25-26.
34. See id. at 26. As Professor Preuss puts it, "[the representative-character theory] explains only those exemptions concerning official acts which diplomatic agents
enjoy in common with other state officials, such as consuls. It fails, moreover, in that
it leaves unexplained those immunities which they possess with reference to acts performed in a private capacity." Preuss, supra note 29, at 180 (footnote omitted).
35. See M. OGDON, supra note 20, at 144-50. For example, although article II,
section 2, paragraph 2 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes the sending of ambassadors, this privilege was not exercised until the late nineteenth century. Id. at 144.
The view was that ambassadors, as personal representatives of monarchs, did not
adequately represent the social democracy of the United States. Id.
36. See, e.g., Hurst, supra note 20, at 6. Articulation of the undeirpinnings of
functional necessity dates back to at least the writings of Grotius in the seventeenth
century. See GRoTlus, supra note 20, at 212. In discussing the opposing interests in
granting immunity to the person of the ambassador, Grotius states that "on the one
side stands the utility of punishment against grave delinquents, [even if they be ambassadors,] and on the other,' the utility of ambassadors, the sending of whom is
facilitated by their having all possible security." Id. (brackets in original).
In the early part of the twentieth century, Sir Cecil B. Hurst stated that
[t]he extraterritoriality or non-subjection to the local jurisdiction enjoyed by
a member of a foreign diplomatic mission is ... due, not to the fact that he is
engaged on the business of a foreign Government, but to the fact that he is
part of the machine for maintaining relations between the two Governments.
Hurst, supra note 20, at 4.
37. See Preuss, supra note 29, at 181.
38. See Hurst, supra note 20, at 13.
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functional-necessity theory, however, is broad in its application, in that it justifies immunities not by whether a particular
act is public or private, but by whether exercising jurisdiction
over the diplomat would interfere with the performance of his
"official functions.
3. Theoretical Bases of the Vienna Convention
The theoretical bases of the Vienna Convention are expressed in the preamble. 40 The Vienna Conference, in drafting the preamble, looked to the intent that the Commission
expressed in its commentary. 4 '
The Commission, in its commentary on the draft articles,
recognized that the exterritoriality and representative-character theories had influenced the development of diplomatic
privileges and immunities.1 2 Moreover, the Commission recognized the emergence of the functional-necessity theory as a
justification for privileges and immunities necessary to enable
the mission to perform its functions.43 In the commentary,
however, the Commission expressed its intent to rely solely on
the representative-character and functional-necessity theo44
ries.
By using this commentary as the basis for writing the preamble, the Conference incorporated the representative-character and functional-necessity theories as the bases for the privileges and immunities afforded by the Convention.4 5 The pre[Tihe purpose for which these immunities are recognized is to enable the
members of a foreign mission to act effectively as the representatives of
their own sovereign in the maintenance of relations with the sovereign to
whom they are accredited, not to enable them to fulfil tasks lying outside
that primary function.
Id.
39. See M. OGDON, supra note 20, at 180.
40. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 3230, T.I.A.S. No.
7502, at 4, 500 U.N.T.S. at 96. The preamble provides in pertinent part that "the
purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure
the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing
States .... Id.
41. See United Nations Conference, supra note 9, at 227.
42. Report of the Comnission's Tenth Session, supra note 16, at 16-17.
43. Id.at 17.
44. See id;Garretson, supra note 23, at 70.
45. See United NVations Conference, supra note 9, at 227. Although many delegates
to the Vienna Conference wanted the preamble to express the functional-necessity
theory as the unequivocal justification for diplomatic privileges and immunities, Mr.
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amble to the Vienna Convention states that the purpose of the
privileges and immunities is to provide for the efficient performance of diplomatic
functions by the missions in their rep46
capacity.
resentative
B. The Diplomatic Bag
The diplomatic bag is the means by which nations and
their missions abroad convey official documents and articles. 4 7
Most diplomatic bags are large canvas sacks 4 8 bearing external
marks of their character. 4 9 The bags are intended for the safe
and confidential conveyance of articles for use by a mission,5 °
such as classified documents, vital communiques, encoding
and decoding equipment, passports, and government seals. 5 '
Before the Vienna Convention, the accepted international
custom 52 was that a receiving state could challenge the legality
Tunkin of the U.S.S.R. reminded the Convention that such was not the intent of the
Commission. See id; see also Garretson, supra note 23, at 70.
46. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 3230, T.I.A.S. No.
'7502, at 4, 500 U.N.T.S. at 96; see supra note 40.
47. See C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTr, supra note 2, at 190. While the British refer
to it as the diplomatic bag, it is known as the diplomatic pouch in the United States
and as lavalise diplomatique in France. Id.
48. See id.The size or weight of a diplomatic bag is not limited. Id. at 219.
Currently, a bag cannot be rejected for size or weight alone. Id. However, the Soviet
Union did, in one instance, cross the line of what can and cannot be considered a
"diplomatic bag." See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
49. C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTr, supra note 2, at 190. There is no requirement
that the identifying marks on the bag be the official seal of the mission or sending
state, but some countries require the official seal as a matter of administration. See E.
DENZA, supra note 5, at 128.
50. C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTT, supra note 2, at 190.
51. Id.
52. International custom is a procedure for the creation of norms of general
international law. See H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 46 (1972); Kunz, The Nature of Customary InternationalLaw, 47 AM. J. INT'L L.
662, 665 (1953). Before custom creates valid norms of general international law, two
conditions must be fulfilled. See Kunz, sapra. The first condition is "usage," which
requires a continuous and repeated practice within the domain of international relations. Id. at 666. The practice need not be universal or unanimous, but "general";
however, a mere majority of states is not enough. Id. The second condition is "opinio
juris," which requires that the practice have been applied with the conviction that it is
legally binding. Id. at 667; see H.W.A THIRLWAY, supra, at 47. In addition, this conviction must not have been challenged by other states. See Kunz, supra, at 667.
To determine whether the two conditions of the custom procedure have been
fulfilled, evidence can be taken from diplomatic correspondence, municipal laws,
court decisions, treaties, negotiations, international decisions, the practice of international organizations, etc. Id.
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of the contents in cases where it had grounds for suspecting
abuse of the bag.5 3 The sending state might then have the bag
returned or allow it to be examined by the authorities of the
receiving state in the presence of a member of its own mission.5 4 The bag could, thus, be stopped and returned but
could not be examined without the permission of the sending
state.5 5
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 27 of the Vienna Convention
provide for the present status of the diplomatic bag.5 6 Under
paragraph 3, the diplomatic bag may not be "opened or detained."'5 7 Paragraph 4 provides that the diplomatic bag may
be used for the transport of only official diplomatic documents
or articles.58
In drafting these paragraphs, the delegates to the Commission and the Conference attempted to balance the opposing interests in, on the one hand, protection for diplomatic
communications and, on the other hand, safeguards against
possible abuse of the diplomatic bag. 59 For example, during
DENZA, supra note 5, at 125.
54. See id. at 125-26.
55. See id.

53. See E.

56. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 27(3)-(4), 23 U.S.T. at 3239,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 13, 500 U.N.T.S. at 110.
57. Id. art. 27(3), 23 U.S.T. at 3239, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 13, 500 U.N.T.S. at
110. In its entirety, paragraph 3 provides as follows: "The diplomatic bag shall not
be opened or detained." Id.
58. Id. art. 27(4), 23 U.S.T. at 3239, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 13, 500 U.N.T.S. at
110. In its entirety, paragraph 4 provides as follows: "The packages constituting the
diplomatic bag must bear visible external marks of their character and may contain
only diplomatic documents or articles intended for official use." Id.
Article 35(3) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides for the
immunity of the consular bag:
The consular bag shall be neither opened nor detained. Nevertheless,
if the competent authorities of the receiving State have serious reason to
believe that the bag contains something other than [official correspondence
and documents or articles intended exclusively for official use], they may
request that the bag be opened in their presence by an authorized representative of the sending State. If this request is refused by the authorities of the
sending State, the bag shall be returned to its place of origin.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 35(3), 21 U.S.T. 77,
99, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 23, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 290. The consular bag serves the
same purpose as the diplomatic bag, but protects the confidentiality of conveyances
between a state and its consular posts abroad. See Kussbach, Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (1963), in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 388, 391 (1986).
59. See United Nations Conference, supra note 9, at 155, 161-62, 179; Sumnmna13
Records of the 457th Meeting, [1958] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 138-39, U.N. Doc.
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the debate in the Vienna Conference, there were two proposed
amendments to the Commission's draft articles that would
provide for a method by which the receiving state could reject
a bag in case of reasonable suspicion of misuse of the particular bag.6 0 Both amendments, however, were rejected. 6 ' One
argument asserted in opposition to the amendments was that if
the diplomatic bag was not provided with absolute inviolability, the value of the bag as a means of free communication for
the sending state would be greatly diminished, if not destroyed.6 2
In addition, the summary records of the debates of the
A/CN.4/SER.A/1958 [hereinafter Records of the 457th Meeting]; Summary Records of the
399th Meeting, [1957] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 78-83, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1957
[hereinafter Records of the 399th Meeting]; Summary Records of the 398th M4eeting, [1957] 1
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 78, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1957 [hereinafter Records of the
398th Meeting]; see also E. DENZA, supra note 5, at 125.
For the purpose of clarification, it must be noted that during the debates of the
ninth session of the Commission, what is now article 27 of the Convention was numbered article 16. See Records of the 398th Meeting, supra, at 74. Similarly, during the
tenth session of the Commision, article 27 was numbered article 21. See Records of the
457th Meeting, supra, at* 138. Finally, during the debates in the Vienna Convention,
article 27 was numbered article 25. See United Nations Conference, supra note 9, at 154.
60. See Ghana: Amendment to Article 25, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.20/C.1/L.294 (1961),
reprinted in United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities: Official
Records, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.20/14/Add.1 (1961) [hereinafter Official Records].
Ghana recommended that paragraph 3 of article 27 provide as follows: "In case of
reasonable suspicion of misuse of any particular bag, the sending State shall have the
right to withdraw such bag unopened." Id. The United Arab Republic proposed an
amendment, one that it later withdrew and was resubmitted by the United Kingdom,
which recommended that paragraph 3 of article 27 read as follows: "The diplomatic
bag shall be exempt from inspection. However, if in an exceptional case the receiving State has serious grounds for suspecting that the diplomatic bag contains articles
other than those mentioned in paragraph 4, the sending State may be required to
withdraw the said bag." See United Arab Republic: Amendments to Article 25, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.20/C.1/L.151/Rev.2 (1961), reprinted in Official Records, supra, at 22.
61. See United Nations Conference, supra note 9, at 180-81. The amendment proposed by Ghana was rejected by 43 votes to 8, with 14 abstentions. Id. at 180. The
amendment proposed by the United Arab Republic, and later resubmitted by the
United Kingdom, was rejected by 37 votes to 22, with 6 abstentions. Id. at 180-81.
62. Id. at 179. The argument was advanced by Mr. G.I. Tunkin, chairman of the
delegation from the U.S.S.R. Id. Mr. Tunkin stressed that "[i]feither [inviolability or
freedom of transport] was not fulfilled, the value of the diplomatic bag as a means of
free communication for the sending State would be greatly diminished, if not destroyed." Id. In direct response to the amendment proposed by the United Arab
Republic, Mr. Tunkin noted that "[t]he granting of such discretionary power to the
receiving State took away the guarantee of freedom of transport for the diplomatic
bag and might at any moment be used to block the channel of communication for
genuine or invented motives." Id.
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Commission indicate that various attempts were made to limit
the permissible contents of the diplomatic bag before the bag
could enjoy inviolability.6" One such proposal would have
placed the paragraph providing for the contents of the bag
before the provision regarding its inviolability.6 4 The argument in favor of this structure was that defining the permissible contents of the bag before providing for its immunity
would make the inviolability of the bag contingent on its contents.6 5 The proposal, however, was withdrawn after the Commission decided that the provisions of the Convention should
express the absolute inviolability of the diplomatic bag. 66 Furthermore, the proposal was rejected because it combined the
inviolability provision and the contents provision into one paragraph. 67 The drafters thought it better that, because the provisions for immunity and for limiting the bag's contents represent two distinct concepts, they should be expressed in two
68
distinct paragraphs.
63. See E. DENZA, supra note 5, at 127.

64. This structure had been proposed by A.E.F. Sandstr6m, the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on the subject of diplomatic intercourse and immunities.
Id. The proposal read as follows: "The diplomatic bag, which may contain only diplomatic documents or articles of a confidential nature intended for official use, shall
be furnished with the sender's seal and bear a visible indication of its character. The
diplomatic bag may not be opened or detained." Diplomatic Intercourseand Immunities,
Revised Draft Articles Proposed by Special Rapporteur, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/116/Add.1

(1958).
65. See Records of the 457th Meeting, supra note 59, at 139; see also E. DENZA, supra

note 5, at 126.
66. See Records of the 457th Meeting, supra note 59, at 139.
67. Id.

68. Id. Mr. RicardoJ. Alfaro of Panama reminded the Commission that the proposed paragraph covered the principle of inviolability as well as the obligation not to
place improper material in the bag. This amalgamation, he said, violated the rule
that each paragraph of an instrument should deal with only one main idea. Id. In
addition, the Commission had previously agreed that the inviolability of the diplomatic bag was to be stated in unequivocal terms as an obligation on the receiving
state and the duty to use the bag only for official purposes as a duty on the sending
state. See Records of the 399th Meeting, supra note 59, at 79-80. The amalgamated form

of the two provisions did not distinguish them as separate obligations, as Mr. Tunkin
expressed in his statement against the proposal:
It had been agreed that the principle of inviolability was absolute . . . and
that in no case was it permissible to open or detain the bags. On the other
hand, there was an obligation of the sending State so far as the contents of
the bag were concerned, though it was very difficult to ascertain whether
that obligation was being carried out.
Records of the 457th Meeting, supra note 59, at 139.
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The Vienna Convention changed the status of the diplomatic bag as recognized by customary international law.6 9
There is no express provision in the Convention that provides
for a course of action in the event of a suspicious bag,7 ° while
previous international practice allowed the receiving state to
stop a suspicious bag and return it or examine it in the presence of a representative from the sending state. 7 ' In fact, two
proposals to provide for this method of contesting the diplomatic bag were rejected. 7 2 Moreover, states have reserved the
right to practice customary international law with regard to the
diplomatic bag,7 3 implying that article 27 itself does not pro69. See E. DENZA, supra note 5, at 125.
70. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 27, 23 U.S.T.at 3239, T.I.A.S. No.
7502, at 13, 500 U.N.T.S. at 108, 110.
71. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
73. See C. LEWIs, supra note 5, at 192. The right of a state to make a reservation
to a treaty has been codified in article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, openedfor signature May 23, 1969, art. 19, 155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336-37 [hereinafter Vienna Convention on Treaties]. Article 19 provides:
A state may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding
to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) The treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) In cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Id.
In acceding to the Vienna Convention in 1969, Kuwait stated:
If the State of Kuwait has reason to believe that the diplomatic pouch contains something which may not be sent by pouch under paragraph 4 of article 27 of the Convention, it considers that it has the right to request that the
pouch be opened in the presence of the representative of the diplomatic
mission (concerned). If this request is refused by the authorities of the
sending State, the diplomatic pouch shall be returned to its place of origin.
See MultilateralTreaties, supra note 19, at 55. Similar reservations were made by Libya
(1977), Saudi Arabia (1981), Qatar (1986), and Yemen (1986). See id. at 55-57.
In acceding to the Convention in 1971, Bahrain stated that "[w]ith respect to
paragraph 3 of article 27, relating to the 'Diplomatic Bag', the Government of the
State of Bahrain reserves its right to open the diplomatic bag if there are serious
grounds for presuming that it contains articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law." Id. at 53 (emphasis added). The following states have objected to
the reservation as being in clear contravention of the principle of the inviolability of
the bag established in article 27: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Haiti, Hungary, Japan, Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Thailand, Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom and the United States. Id. at 57-64. See generally E. DENZA, supra
note 5, at 128.
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vide for the same course of action as did the customary rule.
Other states reject the possibility of such a reservation for fear
that, based on the principle of reciprocity, their bags will be
subject to the same treatment abroad. 4
II. JUSTIFICA TIONS FOR NONINTR USIVE EXAMINA TIONS
A. Guns, Bodies, and Drugs: Abuses of the Diplomatic Bag
Because of its protected status under the Vienna Convention, the diplomatic bag has become the ideal container for the
international transport of contraband and weaponry.7 5 Several
instances stand out as the most notorious uses of the bag.
On April 17, 1984, an unknown assassin fired a machine
gun from the Libyan People's Bureau into a crowd of demonstrators in London's St. James's Square, killing a policewoman. 7 6 British intelligence officials believe that the rifle linked
to the murder was smuggled out of the United Kingdom in a
diplomatic bag, thus removing evidence crucial to any possible
77
trial.
74. See THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, REPORT TO SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF COMM. ON FOR-

EIGN AFFAIRS OF U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON BILL H.R. 3036, REVISION OF
DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACT, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 n.26 (1988)
[hereinafter REPORT TO SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS]; Higgins, supra
note 4, at 648; Thorny Issue, supra note 1, at col. 3; see also infra notes 120-24 and
accompanying text. The principle of reciprocity means that if a receiving state
reserves the right to stop, return, or open diplomatic bags, that state may expect its
bags to receive the same treatment abroad. See Higgins, supra note 4, at 648.
75. See C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTr, supra note 2, at 190-223; Thorny Issue, supra
note 1, col. 4.
76. See Higgins, supra note 4, at 643. The demonstration had been held to protest Colonel Qaddafi's government. Id. Both the Foreign Office in London and the

British Ambassador in Tripoli had been warned the day before the incident that if the
demonstration went ahead, Libya "would not be responsible for its consequences."
Id. The officer killed was Woman Police Constable Fletcher, who had been on duty in
the square. Id.
77. See C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTr, supra note 2, at 157-58. On April 27, 1984,

the Bureau was evacuated. See Higgins, supra note 4, at 644 (quoting H.C. Foreign
Affairs Comm., First Report, The Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges, Report with an
Annex; Together with the Proceedings of the Committee; Minutes of Evidence Taken on 20June
and 2 and 18July in the Last Session of Parliament,and Appendices, First Report, 77, (Dec.
12, 1984)). Those leaving were questioned and electronically searched. Id. Diplomatic bags that left the Bureau, however, were not searched or scanned. Id. The
decision not to search the diplomatic bags was generally assumed to be part of the
United Kingdom's obligation under the Vienna Convention. See id. at 648. The
Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth office stated that the decision not
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The Soviet Union attempted to expand the definition of
the diplomatic bag by trying to send a sealed, nine-ton truck
into Switzerland, claiming the entire vehicle as a diplomatic
bag. 78 Swiss authorities refused to acknowledge the truck as a
diplomatic bag and would not allow the truck to be unloaded. 79 The truck was sent back to Moscow through Bonn,
where, at the Soviet embassy, more than 200 crates were unloaded from the truck and stamped as individual bags. 80
One of the most notorious attempts to abuse the diplomatic bag occurred shortly after a coup in Nigeria in December
of 1983.81 Umaru Dikko, the minister of transportation under
the old regime, fled to London to escape trial under Nigeria's
newly-established government. 82 Dikko was kidnapped from
his home in London and was drugged, blindfolded, and
bound.8 3 The kidnappers placed Dikko in a crate and sent it to
Stansted Airport in England as "extra cargo" for an aircraft
bound for Nigeria, claiming it as a diplomatic bag. 84 Customs
officials at the airport noticed a medicinal smell coming from
the crate. 85 The officials opened the crate after determining
that it was not a diplomatic bag (as claimed), because it had no
to search the bags was political, in that Libya, in acceding to the Convention, reserved the right to search diplomatic bags, thus increasing the possibility of reciprocal treatment of bags from the United Kingdom to Libya. Id. For a detailed discussion of the St. James's Square incident, see C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTT, supra note 2,
at 128-64.
78. See C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTr, supra note 2, at 191.
79. Id. at 192. The Vienna Convention does not specify any size or weight limitation for a diplomatic bag, but the Swiss officials considered 450 pounds to be the
maximum allowable size. Id. at 191-92. The Swiss officials sealed the truck, but allowed it to continue to Geneva. Id. In Geneva, the Soviets refused to reveal the
contents of the truck, and the Swiss would not unseal it. Id. at 192. The stalemate
forced the Russians to return the truck to Moscow. Id.
80. Id. at 192-93. The Germans had refused to accept the truck as a diplomatic
bag not because of its size, but because it was a motorized vehicle, capable of its own
free movement. Id. at 192. The inspection of the truck eventually took place on
Soviet embassy property in Bonn. Id. After the inspection, the truck was allowed to
proceed on its way back to the Soviet Union. Id. at 193.
81. Id. at 204.
82. Id. at 204-05. Dikko was the brother-in-law of deposed Nigerian President
Shagari, who had been overthrown in the military coup in December of 1983. Id. at
204. Dikko was alleged to have helped lead Nigeria to a condition of near-bankruptcy and was, therefore, on a "most wanted" list as an "economic saboteur." Id.
83. Id. at 205, 207.
84. Id. at 207-09.
85. Id. at 208-09.
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official seal and was not marked "diplomatic." 6 If the crate
had been properly marked, the officials at the airport could not
have opened it without violating the Vienna Convention. 7
The most wide-spread abuse of the diplomatic bag occurs
in drug trafficking.88 One incident involved Ludovicus Vastenavondt, chancellor at the Belgian embassy in New Delhi, India. 89 On May 25, 1985, Vastenavondt arrived at Kennedy Airport in New York carrying a diplomatic bag. 90 He proceeded
to a hotel and gave the bag to a man awaiting him.9 The bag
contained twenty-two pounds of heroin valued in excess of
US$40 million.9 2 Vastenavondt, upon returning to the same
hotel the following night to collect his courier fee, was arrested.93 The man to whom Vastenavondt had delivered the
heroin turned out to be an agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.94
The above examples represent the various ways the diplomatic bag has been abused. In addition, diplomats often import goods for personal profit.9" U.S.. customs officials estimate that, after drugs, art treasures are the single most lucrative illegal import via the diplomatic bag.96 In the United
86. Id. In addition, paragraph 5 of article 27 provides that a diplomatic courier
accompanying a diplomatic bag must have "an official document indicating his status." Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 27(5), 23 U.S.T. at 3239, T.I.A.S. No.
7502, at 13, 500 U.N.T.S. at 110. The crate that contained Mr. Dikko was accompanied by an attache, not a courier, and the attach6 could produce no credentials to
prove that the crate was a diplomatic bag. C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTr, supra note 2, at
209. Naturally, Dikko was grateful for his rescue, later saying that if his kidnappers
had been successful, he would have faced "torture, a show trial, and possibly a firing
squad." Id. at 211.
87. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 27, 23 U.S.T. at 3239, T.I.A.S. No.
7502, at 13, 500 U.N.T.S. at 108, 110.
88. C. ASHMAN & P. TREscoTr, supra note 2, at 199.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 166.

93. Id. After his arrest, Vastenavondt attempted to claim diplomatic immunity.
Id. However, he was not entitled to protection on U.S. soil because he was not part

of an accredited diplomatic mission to the United States. Id.
94. Id. U.S. Attorney RaymondJ. Dearie, who prosecuted Vastenavondt, stated
in a press conference that "[t]he world should know that there is a kind of certified
way of entry for illicit drugs through the violation of diplomatic privileges .... If it's
a diplomatic pouch, it cannot be touched." Id. at 167.
95. C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCO-rr, supra note 2, at 193.
96. Id. at 199.
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Kingdom, there have been several cases of illegal possession
by diplomats of firearms that were imported in diplomatic
bags. 97 Because of the nature of the confidentiality of the diplomatic bag, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the extent to which diplomatic bags are used for illegal
purposes .98
B. Proposals and Legal Rationale in Support of
Nonintrusive Examinations
Instances of international smuggling and other crimes
have provoked proposals to remedy the abuses of the privileged bag. Among the most frequently proposed remedies are
x-ray machines and dogs trained to detect narcotics. 9 9 Legislators in the United States have introduced legislation to restrict
the privilege afforded the diplomatic bag.' °0 For example, a
bill currently sponsored by Congressman Stephen J. Solarz in
the U.S. House of Representatives would direct the President
to adopt a measure to prevent misuse of the diplomatic bag,
with special consideration toward curbing terrorism and drug
trafficking.' 0 ' Such a measure would presumably allow for
97. Id. at 215.
98. Id. at 199.
99. Thorny Issue, supra note 1, col. 6.
100. Id. col. 3.
101. See H.R. 3036, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The proposed legislation is
part of a bill sponsored by Representative Solarz that would hold diplomats and their
governments more accountable for their activities in the United States. See id.; Thorn)
Issue, supra note 1. Section 10 of the bill provides:
The President shall(1) review the treatment accorded to diplomatic pouches under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations . . . in order to preclude the use
of diplomatic pouches for the transportation of unauthorized materials, particularly those used to foster terrorism; and
(2) seek in every appropriate forum the adoption of measures which
will ensure that diplomatic pouches are not used to smuggle illicit narcotics,
explosives, weapons, and any material used to foster terrorism.
H.R. 3036, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 10 (1987).
Section 10 of the bill is new subject-matter for U.S. legislation. Other sections of
the bill would amend current legislation as follows: § 2 (Compensation for Victims
of Crimes Committed by Diplomats) would amend § 1403(b) of the Victims of Crime
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); § 3 (Crimes Committed by Diplomats) would amend § 204 of the Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4304 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986); § 4 (Registration and Departure Procedures for Individuals with
Diplomatic Immunity) would amend § 210 of the State Department Basic Authorities
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4310 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); § 5 (Waiver of Diplomatic Immunity
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nonintrusive examinations, such as electronic scanning and examination by dogs, of diplomatic bags entering the United
0 2
States.
The legal adviser to the United Kingdom's Foreign and
Commonwealth Office has expressed his government's view
that remote examinations by equipment or dogs would be lawful under the Convention.'
This conclusion is drawn from
the fact that article 27 requires only that the bag not be
"opened or detained" and is, thus, not completely inviolable.'0 4 The United Kingdom, however, has not implemented
such measures to attempt to curb abuses of the diplomatic
bag. 10 5 In fact, in mid-1984, when the government of Kuwait
started scanning bags, the United Kingdom led the international protest against the practice.1° 6
In 1977, the International Law Commission included on
the agenda of its twenty-ninth session consideration of proposals on the status of the diplomatic courier and the diplomatic
bag not accompanied by diplomatic courier. 0 7 During the dewhen Charged with a Serious Crime) would amend § 212(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); and § 8 (Minimum Insurance Coverage) and § 9 (Liability Insurance to be Carried by Diplomatic Missions)
would amend §§ 6(b) and 6 of the Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 254c(b),
254(c) (1982).
Congressman Solarz plans to reintroduce the bill in the 101st session of Congress. Telephone interview with the Office of the International Operations Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Feb. 21, 1989).
102. See Thorny Issue, supra note 1, cols. 3, 6. The position of the U.S. Department of State is that any provision that would allow scanning of the bag risks compromising the confidentiality of sensitive communications equipment and other contents
of the bag. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 55. As such, the inviolability of the bag must be maintained. Id.
103. See C. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 192; Higgins, supra note 4, at 647.
104. See C. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 192; Higgins, supra note 4, at 647.
105. See Higgins, supra note 4, at 647; see also Cameron, supra note 5, at 617.
106. See C. ASHMAN & P. TREScorr, supra note 2, at 217-18. Kuwait's implementation of scanning was provoked by a series of bombings blamed on Iranian extremists. Id.

107. See Sunima y Records of the 1415th .Vleeting, [1977] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 3,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1977; see also THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION at 106, U.N. Sales No. E.88.V.1 (1988) [hereinafter WORK OF THE COMMISSION]. In 1975, the General Assembly expressed the need for strict implementation
by states of the Vienna Convention. G.A. Res. 3501, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34)
at 154, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975). In 1976, the General Assembly, still concerned
by continuing instances of violations of the rules of diplomatic law, requested the
Commission to begin work on a protocol concerning the status of the diplomatic

512 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 12:494
bate on the status of the diplomatic bag,10 8 several members of
the Commission suggested that the implementation of electronic devices to examine diplomatic bags would provide the
best compromise between protecting the confidentiality of diplomatic communications and curbing abuses of the bag.10 9
The final draft of the article relating to the status of the diplomatic bag, however, indicates that a majority of the Commission delegates did not favor the electronic examination of the

bag.'1 o
Proponents of nonintrusive examinations argue that
paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 27 of the Vienna Convention do
not provide the diplomatic bag with absolute inviolability." 11
Paragraph 3 of article 27, if construed literally, would only precourier and bag. G.A. Res. 31/76, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 181, U.N. Doc.
A/31/39 (1976).
108. See Summary Records of the Meetings of the 38th Session, [1986] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 36-56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1986; Summary Records of the Meetings of the
37th Session, [1985] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 164-208, 222-27, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1985; Summary Records of the Meetings of the 36th Session, [1984] 1 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 177-98, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1984.
109. See Summary Records of the 1949th Meeting, [1986] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 42,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1986. Mr. Chafic Malik expressed the opinion that
"[s]ince electronic and mechanical devices were proving quite effective in preventing
acts of sabotage against civil aircraft, examination of the diplomatic bag ... by such
means should be permitted. Id.
110. Report of the Commission's Thirty-Eighth Session, supra note 7, at 68. The final
draft article submitted by the Commission to the United Nations member states for
comments and observations provided for the protection of the diplomatic bag as follows: "The diplomatic bag shall [be inviolable wherever it may be; it shall] not be
opened or detained [and shall be exempt from examination directly or through electronic or other technical devices]." Id. The bracketed portions of the article reflect
the several areas of disagreement that the Commission could not resolve. Id.
Several members of the Commission believed that the diplomatic bag should not
be electronically scanned. Mr. El Rashed Mohamed Ashmed of the Sudan argued
that scanning constituted a form of inspection and, thus, should be carried out only
with the consent of the sending state and in the presence of its authorized agent. See
Summary Records of the 1907th Meeting; [1985] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 186, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1985. Messrs. Lacleta Mufioz of Spain and Barboza of Argentina
both expressed the fear that, in light of the rapid growth of technology, electronic
scanning could soon be used to read 'the documents contained in diplomatic bags.
Id. at 180, 183. Finally, Mr., Balanda of Zaire expressed the view that the use of
electronic scanning, if authorized, would place developing countries at a disadvantage, because they would often be unable to afford such devices to use by way of
reciprocity. Id. at 186.
111. See E. DENZA, supra note 5,;at 4; C. LEwis, supra note 5, at 192. Black's Law
Dictionary defines "inviolability" as. "the attribute of being secured against violation," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY', supra note 21, at 741, and "absolute" as "complete;
perfect; final; without any condition or incumbrance." 'Id. at 9.
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clude the opening or detaining of a diplomatic bag, 1 2 but
would seemingly allow for examinations that do not physically
penetrate the bag itself." 3 In addition, paragraph 4 of article
27. limits the contents of the diplomatic bag to "diplomatic
documents or articles intended for official use. '" 1 4 If the bag is
used for nondiplomatic purposes, it is no longer protected by
the immunity provided in paragraph 3 and can,
at the very
t 5
least, be nonintrusively examined or inspected."
Proponents of nonintrusive examinations also find support for remedial proposals in the theories and principles that
serve as the foundation for the entire Convention. One argument is that because one of the theoretical bases of the Convention is the functional-necessity theory,"' any use of the
diplomatic bag for nondiplomatic purposes waives the privi17
leges and immunities that are afforded by the Convention."
In such a situation, the bag would no longer be inviolable and
could be subject to inspection."t 8 In addition, from a policy
point of view, those in favor of permitting nonintrusive inspections of the diplomatic bag argue that, in light of abuses of the
diplomatic bag, the interest in providing for confidential diplomatic communications should be subservient to the domestic
interest a receiving state may have in preventing terrorism,
smuggling, and other international crimes.'19
Although the abuse of the diplomatic bag is a widely recognized problem, states have not implemented remedial measures or retained customary international law, because the Vienna Convention is based on the principle of reciprocity. 2 0 In
112. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 27(3); 23 U.S.T. at 3239, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, at 13, 500 U.N.T.S. at 110.
113. See Summary Records of the 1906th Meeting, [1985] 1 YV.B. INT'L. L. COMM'N
178-79, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1985 [hereinafter Records of the 1906th Meeting]; see

also Higgins, supra note 4, at 647.
114. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 27(4), 23 U.S.T. at 3239, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, at 13, 500 U.N.T.S. at 110.
115. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 4.
116. See supra notes 36-39, 45 and accompanying text.
117. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 4; Higgins, supra note 4, at 647.
118. See Higgins, supra note 4, at 647.
119.,See Records of the 1906th Meeting, supra note 113, at 180-81.
120. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 4, at 648 (United Kingdom's decision not to
search diplomatic bags of Libyans partly because of fear of reciprocity); DEP'T OF
STATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 54 (U.S. Department of State opposes remedial measures because of United States's interests as a sender of diplomatic bags); see also Thorny
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other words, if state A subjects incoming diplomatic bags from
state B to nonintrusive examinations, state A may expect its
diplomatic bags to receive the same treatment in state B, a very
disagreeable result for states with a large diplomatic network.
For example, the proposed bill in the U.S. House of Representatives 2 1 is opposed by the State Department because bags
of the United States would be subject abroad to any remedial
measures implemented by the United States. 12 2 In addition,
although the government of the United Kingdom takes the position that scanning or other examinations by equipment or
dogs do not contravene the Vienna Convention, 2 3 fear of adverse reciprocal consequences has prevented the implementa1 24
tion of remedial measures by the United Kingdom.
III. THE PROPRIETY OF NONINTRUSIVE EXAMINATIONS
UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION
The propriety of nonintrusive examinations or inspections
of the diplomatic bag necessarily depends on the construction
of the Vienna Convention, in general, and of article 27, in particular.' 25 The theories upon which the Convention's priviIssue, supra note 1. The concept of reciprocity is provided for in article 47(2)(a). Article 47 states in its entirety as follows:
1. In the application of the provisions of the present Convention, the
receiving State shall not discriminate as between States.
2. However, discrimination shall not be regarded as taking place:
(a) where the receiving State applies any of the provisions of the present
Convention restrictively because of a restrictive application of that provision to its mission in the sending State;
(b) where by custom or agreement States extend to each other more favourable treatment than is required by the provisions of the present Convention.
Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 47, 23 U.S.T. at 3248-49, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at
22-23, 500 U.N.T.S. at 122, 124; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
122. See DEP'T OF STATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 54; Thorny Issue, supra note 1.
The United States is the largest sender of diplomatic bags. Id. From April to December of 1987, the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which oversees
the flow of U.S. diplomatic bags, received 52,914 from missions abroad and dispatched 42,446. Id.
123. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
125. See E.S.

YAMBRUSIC,

TREATY INTERPRETATION 10 (1987). The scholarly writ-

ings on the subject of treaty interpretation can be separated into the three categories
of "clear sense," the intention of parties, and the concept of contextuality. Id. at 9.
The notion of "clear sense" expresses the view that words in a legal instrument
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leges and immunities are based 1 26 support the argument that
the diplomatic bag, if used illicitly, may be subject to nonintrusive examinations. The preamble to the Vienna Convention
conveys the intent of the Commission and the Conference delegates to base the privileges and immunities provided by the
Convention on both the functional-necessity and representative-character theories.1 27 If a diplomatic bag is used to convey
illegal articles, the bag is theoretically inviolable. The functional-necessity theory justifies an immunity only if such immunity is necessary for the efficient functioning of the diplomatic
such as a treaty have meaning in themselves. Id. If the meaning is logical and rational, there is a legal obligation to abide by that meaning. Id. This principle has
been criticized for ignoring the need for interpretation in the application of international agreements. Id. at 10.
The "intention of the parties" school of thought stresses the probative character
of interpretation. Id. at 12. The two-tier test that is applied first requires that the
intentions of the parties be ascertained and, then, that the text of the treaty be interpreted in light of those intentions. Id. This method has been criticized as "fictional"
and artificial. Id.
The weight of authority has supported the concept of contextuality. Id. at 10.
This view suggests that a text constitutes the authentic interprietation by establishing
the "ordinary" and "natural" meaning of words in the context in which they are
used. Id. Nevertheless, there is still controversy depending on who is doing the interpreting, as well as on the degree of emphasis and the general understanding of the
context. Id.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties provides for the general rule of
treaty interpretation:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an
instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpre-'
tation of the treaty or the application of its pro-visions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that
the parties so intended.
Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 73, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
126. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
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process. 28 In addition, the representative-character theory
identifies the diplomatic acts as acts of the sending state 2 9
and, thus, does not offer a basis for granting immunity for un0
official acts. 13
Interpreting article 27 to permit nonintrusive examinations because the above-stated theories do not provide for immunity in the event of a misused bag, however, ignores a practical problem. In order to determine if a bag is being used
illegally and, thus, is arguably not inviolable, the bag must first
be inspected or examined. 13 This would result in the examination of bags that are being used for official purposes and, as
such, are inviolable. An analysis of the debates of paragraphs
3 and 4 of article 27 indicates that the drafters of the Convention did not intend the inviolability of the diplomatic bag to be
contingent on its contents, thus, rendering any means by which
32
to determine the contents contrary to the bag's inviolability.
Several attempts were made to limit the permissible contents of the bag while the members of the Commission were
33
discussing the immunity to be afforded the diplomatic bag.
For example, it was proposed that the paragraph providing for
the contents of the bag be placed before the provision regarding its inviolability. 34 The majority of the delegates rejected
the proposal, fearing that this structure would imply that the
inviolability of the bag depended on the observance of the contents-limitation provision.' 3 5 The rejection of this proposal
conveys that a majority of the Commission intended the diplomatic bag to be absolutely inviolable, even in the face of possible abuse. A nonintrusive examination that could reveal the
nature of the contents of a bag would violate the status of the
bag as intended by the drafters.
Furthermore, the above proposal consolidated the inviolability provision and the content limitation provision into. one
128. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

131. See Higgins, supra note 4, at 647.
132. See Records of the 457lh Meeting, supra note 59, at 139; Cameron, supra note 5,

at 617.
133. See E. DENZA, supra note 5, at 127.
134. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
135. See Records of the 457th .1Itg., supra note 59, at 139.
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paragraph.1 6 The Commission adopted the structure of the
text with these two provisions as separate paragraphs instead
of the combined form, following the Commission's general
rule that distinct issues should be placed in separate
paragraphs.' 3 7 Thus, the delegates intended the inviolability
paragraph to be a duty on the receiving state and the content
limitations paragraph to be a duty on the sending state.' 38 The
duty of the receiving state to abide by the principle of inviolability is not dependent on whether the sending state abides by
the restriction placed on the permissible contents of the diplomatic bag. 1 39 Nonintrusive examinations would violate the
drafters' intent to keep the principle of the inviolability of the
bag separate from the nature of the contents of the bag.
Finally, the Vienna Convention should be interpreted
within the context of the overall policy that the drafters of the
Convention desired paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 27 to convey.
In the summary records of the debate of article 27, many delegates discuss policy concerns that the abuses provoked by the
inviolable status of the diplomatic bag must be curbed. 4 0 The
Commission did not ignore these concerns. In the Commentary to the draft articles that it presented to the United Nations, the Commission recognized the fact that the immunity of
the diplomatic bag was often abused but reminded the signatories that the bag was meant to protect the confidentiality of
diplomatic conveyances.' 4 1 Nevertheless, article 27, although
drafted with complete awareness of the abuses associated with
136. See id.

137.
138.
139.
140.

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Id.
See Cameron, supra note 5, at 617; see also E. DENZA, supra note 5, at 126-27.
See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.

141. See Report of the Commission's Tenth Session, supra note 16, at 19. The Com-

mentary states that
[t]he Commission has noted that the diplomatic bag has on occasion been
opened with the permission of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State, and in the presence of a representative of the mission concerned.
While recognizing that States have been led to take such measures in exceptional cases where there were serious grounds for suspecting that the diplomatic bag was being used in a manner contrary to paragraph 4 of the article,
and with detriment to the interests of the receiving State, the Commission
wishes nevertheless to emphasize the overriding importance which it attaches to the observance of the principle of the inviolability of the diplomatic bag.

518 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 12:494
the diplomatic bag, in no way qualifies or limits the inviolability of the bag. 14 2 In fact, article 27 expands the immunity of
the diplomatic bag as recognized by customary international
law. 143 The drafters intended article 27 to cloak the diplomatic
bag with absolute inviolability, even in the face of possible
abuse. Nonintrusive examinations violate this intent.
Although the Vienna Convention precludes nonintrusive
examinations, the reality of the abuses of the diplomatic bag
cannot be ignored. Because the bag has become a means by
which to accomplish illegal and often dangerous ends, the regime controlling the inviolability of the bag warrants reconsideration. There is no doubt that the confidentiality of diplomatic conveyances must be protected. However, in light of the
severity and multitude of abuses, receiving states should have
some way to at least challenge a bag about which suspicions
have arisen.
The International Law Commission has provisionally
adopted draft articles concerning the status of the diplomatic
bag.' 44 Paragraph 1 of article 28 of the draft articles, if
adopted by the United Nations as written, would expressly
prohibit examinations of the diplomatic bag through electronic
or other technical devices.' 4 5 Paragraph 2 of article 28 would
allow states to electronically examine consular bags that the
sending state seriously believes to contain illicit articles. In addition, paragraph 2 provides that if such examination does not
satisfy the receiving state, the consular bag may be opened in
the presence of a member of the sending state or may be returned to the sending state. 146
142. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 27, 23 U.S.T. at 3239, T.I.A.S. No.
7502, at 13, 500 U.N.T.S. at 108, 110.
143. See supra notes 53-55, 69-72.
144. See WORK OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 107, at 109; see also supra notes
107-10 and accompanying text.
145. See sapra note 110 and accompanying text.
146. See Report of the Commission's Thirty-Eighth Session, supra note 7, at 68. Para-

graph 2 of article 28 provides as follows:
Nevertheless, if the competent authorities of the receiving [or the transit]
State have serious reasons to believe that the [consular] bag contains something other than the correspondence, documents or articles referred to in
article 25, they may request [that the bag be subjected to examination
through electronic or other technical devices. If such examination does not
satisfy the competent authorities of the receiving [or the transit] State, they
may further request] that the bag be opened in their presence by an author-
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The undisputed part of paragraph 2 is derived from the
second and third sentences of article 35, paragraph 3, of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 4 7 During the
Commission's debates of paragraph 2, various delegates urged
that the regime providing for the status of the consular bag be
extended to the diplomatic bag.' 4 8 Such an extension would
create a balance between protecting confidential diplomatic
conveyances and securing the receiving state against abuses of
the bag.' 4 9 In addition, it is an acceptable compromise because it allows sending states, as opposed to the receiving
states, to confront a diplomat who has abused a bag, by consenting to the opening of the bag or having the bag returned.
CONCLUSION
Diplomats are accused of using the diplomatic bag for the
import or export of currency, narcotic drugs, weaponry, and
even human beings. Although these practices violate the permissible use of the diplomatic bag and threaten the security of
the receiving state, the implementation of remedial measures
such as nonintrusive examinations violates article 27 of the Vienna Convention. Prudence requires that the interests of the
receiving state be a consideration in determining the appropriate status of the diplomatic bag.
The latest results of the International Law Commission reflect the need to achieve a more equitable balance than that
ized representative of the sending State. If [either] [this] request is refused
by the authorities of the sending State, the competent authorities of the receiving [or transit] State may require that the bag be returned to its place of
origin.
Id. (brackets in original). The bracketed portions of the article reflect the several
areas of disagreement that the Commission could not resolve. Id. at 69.
147. Id; see supra note 7 and accompanying text. If paragraph 2 of the draft article were adopted by the United Nations without the bracketed parts, it would provide
for the diplomatic bag as follows:
Nevertheless, if the competent authorities of the receiving State have serious reasons to believe that the bag contains something other than the correspondence, documents or articles referred to in article 25, they may request
that the bag be opened in their presence by an authorized representative of
the sending State. If this request is refused by the authorities of the sending
State, the competent authorities of the receiving State may require that the
bag be returned to its place of origin.
Report of the Commission's Thirty-Eighth Session, supra note 7, at 68.

148. Id. at 72.
149. Id.
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provided by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
The reimplementation of what was the customary international
practice with regard to the diplomatic bag introduces the most
appropriate balance between the opposing interests of the
sending and receiving states. In addition, it augments the
sending and receiving states' common interest in tranquil and
efficient foreign relations.
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